AWS announced on November 9, 2026, that IAM outbound identity federation can let a workload cross AWS partition boundaries: STS in the source partition issues a short-lived, signed JSON Web Token (JWT), and STS in the destination partition exchanges it for temporary credentials if the destination role’s trust policy permits the request. The role’s permissions then determine which resources the workload can access. AWS’s announcement describes the flow and its configuration.
Treat the JWT as proof of workload identity, not as permission to access a resource. The destination role’s trust policy and permissions still control access.
How the exchange works across partitions
The workload calls sts:GetWebIdentityToken in its source partition to obtain the signed JWT. It presents that token, along with the destination role ARN, to STS in the other partition through sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity. If the token and the role’s trust policy pass validation, destination STS returns temporary credentials. The workload uses those credentials to make requests allowed by the role’s permissions.
An OIDC provider is the destination-side configuration that lets the role trust the token’s identity issuer. The token carries workload identity claims, including the source account, principal ARN, and Region. The destination role’s trust policy can evaluate those claims; the token itself does not grant access to an S3 bucket or any other resource.
What administrators configure
AWS’s walkthrough uses two accounts: one in GovCloud (US), in us-gov-west-1, and one in the Commercial partition, in us-east-1. The workload requests access to an S3 bucket in the destination account. The example configures source-side permission to enable federation and request tokens, then a destination OIDC provider, a role trust policy, and permissions for the resource.
In production, AWS says an EC2 instance profile, Lambda execution role, or EKS Pod role can provide the workload identity. The manual role-assumption step in the command-line walkthrough demonstrates the flow; those workload identities can supply the role without that demonstration step.
AWS’s example uses a 300-second token duration and ES384 signing. Those are example settings, not universal requirements. Its destination trust example checks the token subject and audience as well as source Region and organization; AWS also describes conditions based on source account and principal context.
Access controls and audit trail
Administrators can use the destination trust policy to restrict which workload identities are accepted. AWS also describes controls for limiting trusted federation providers or source Regions, including aws:CrossPartitionSourceRegion. A policy can deny access after credentials have been issued; AWS says the denial takes effect for an active session on its next API call.
For auditing, AWS says the source GetWebIdentityToken event and destination AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity event in CloudTrail can be matched using the same webIdentityTokenId. The destination event also identifies the source principal and Region.
AWS recommends checking regulatory and compliance obligations before enabling cross-partition access. Its guidance is to direct access from the more restrictive partition toward the less restrictive one.
Where the feature applies
AWS said the capability was available in all Regions of the Commercial, China, GovCloud (US), and European Sovereign Cloud partitions, at no additional cost. This federation mechanism is for crossing partition boundaries. For cross-account access within one partition, AWS points to sts:AssumeRole; for organizations that already operate a public key infrastructure, it also names IAM Roles Anywhere as an alternative.