Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a flaw in the Web Experimentation signup flow on November 16, 2026, and inserted malicious JavaScript into customer projects. The altered snippets were served through the service’s regular delivery path. Report URI found 188 infected snippets among 1,611 it examined, associated with 178 organizations. Optimizely’s incident notice and Report URI’s analysis describe the company’s account and the researcher’s observations, respectively.
How malicious code reached customer websites
Optimizely said the entry point was a flaw in the Web Experimentation account signup flow. Report URI found malicious code in the optional Project JavaScript field of customer projects. The resulting snippets continued to be served through the usual Optimizely delivery route, including its CDN. A customer page that loads a third-party script runs that code in the context of the page, which makes the provider’s delivery path consequential when a project script is altered.
A third-party script can become an attack route when code in a provider-side project is changed.
What the infected-script count describes
Report URI examined 1,611 distinct snippets and found 188 infected snippets associated with 178 organizations. The figures count snippets and their associated organizations in the researcher’s observed set. Report URI said its count could be incomplete because it could inspect only snippets it found.
The count describes the scope of that script review. It does not give a visitor total: how many people loaded a particular snippet depends on the site and its traffic, while the reported unit here is the snippet. Report URI recorded its first observed Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on November 16 and said the card-skimming function was added at 13:43 UTC. It also reported that the payload was rebuilt 26 times during the incident.
What the injected code could access
Report URI described code that could replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses and inspect accessible payment submissions and fetch or XHR POST requests for card numbers, expiration dates and security codes. The analyzed skimmer could not read payment fields hosted in cross-origin iframes. For cookies, the code’s document.cookie access excluded cookies marked HttpOnly.
The analysis also described conditional collection of page URLs, JavaScript-readable cookies and screenshots when a wallet address was replaced near payment-related wording. For iOS devices, Report URI described attempts to load Coruna for iOS 13–17 and DarkSword for iOS 18.x; it also reported a separate iOS 26 chain that was fingerprinting devices. These are capabilities and behaviors attributed to the analyzed code.
What Optimizely said it did
Optimizely said it detected the activity on November 16, blocked delivery, closed the flaw within three hours of detection, removed injected code from affected projects, secured affected accounts and contacted every Web Experimentation customer directly. In its fuller update on November 18, the company said the incident affected less than 5% of its customers, was limited to Web Experimentation and was not a credentials breach. It also said no other Optimizely product was affected.
Report URI separately counted one infected snippet in its observed set at 21:52 UTC on November 16. That timestamped customer-snippet observation and Optimizely’s account of its systems and remediation describe distinct checkpoints.