Windows updates released on and after November 10, 2026 begin making clients offer NTLM message signing by default. Microsoft schedules servers to require signing beginning in May 2027, so administrators can use the intervening period to find connections that do not negotiate it. The change strengthens NTLM; it does not remove it. Microsoft’s support guidance lays out the phases and the audit checks.
What Microsoft’s NTLM signing changes do
NTLM is a legacy Windows network-authentication protocol. Message signing adds a cryptographic integrity check to NTLM messages, helping reduce exposure to relay attacks. In the first phase, clients begin offering signing by default with updates released on or after November 10, 2026, while servers continue to accept both signed and unsigned clients. Microsoft schedules the next phase to begin in May 2027, when Windows servers will require signing by default and reject clients that do not offer it.
| Policy stage | Timing | Client and server behavior | Practical effect |
| Client signing by default | Updates released on and after November 10, 2026 | Clients offer signing by default; servers accept signed and unsigned clients | Connections can negotiate signing without servers yet rejecting unsigned clients by default |
| Server signing requirement | Scheduled to begin in May 2027 | Servers require signing by default and reject clients that do not offer it | Unsigned NTLM clients may fail to connect |
| Network NTLM disabled by default | A future major Windows Server release and associated client releases | Network NTLM is planned to be disabled by default; NTLM remains in the OS and can be re-enabled by policy | A separate, broader change from signing enforcement |
The third row is a separate Microsoft roadmap plan, not another date in the signing rollout. Microsoft has not specified the future release date in its Windows security roadmap. Requiring signing still allows signed NTLM authentication. Anonymous and guest connections are exempt from the signing requirement, and Kerberos is unaffected.
Audit first, enforce second: check the negotiated flags and session-key status, not the event’s warning level alone.
How to find NTLM connections that do not sign
Check client Event 4022 and server Event 4023 in Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational. Microsoft says these events are available on Windows Server 2019 and later when NTLM Enhanced auditing is enabled. For each connection, look for the SIGN flag (0x00000010), the KEY_EXCH flag (0x40000000), and a present session key. The event’s Warning level alone does not tell you whether signing was negotiated.
The distinction between two NTLM flags matters: NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN indicates real message signing, while the legacy NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN flag (0x00008000) is a 16-byte zero placeholder and provides no cryptographic protection by itself. Microsoft describes a secure signed connection as having SIGN, KEY_EXCH, and a session key.
After auditing shows no unsigned connections, administrators can use ServerRequireNtlmSign=1 to reject unsigned clients before the scheduled default enforcement. The setting is a REG_DWORD at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0; Microsoft says it requires no restart. It enforces signing for NTLM connections, rather than disabling all NTLM.
What Microsoft plans for Kerberos fallback
NTLM remains in use in some environments because of legacy application dependencies, local-account authentication, or a lack of direct connectivity to a domain controller. Microsoft’s roadmap describes IAKerb for some domain-controller connectivity scenarios and Local KDC for local-account authentication. It also says Windows components are to be updated to negotiate Kerberos first; the roadmap describes IAKerb and Local KDC as pre-release capabilities.
Microsoft’s roadmap connects those planned Kerberos capabilities to specific NTLM fallback cases, while identifying hardcoded NTLM use as another dependency administrators may need to address.