Wiz reported that an actor used credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume customer-created AWS IAM roles between October 14 and 26, 2026. The roles opened access to customer environments through cross-account trust relationships; the reported route did not run through AWS’s underlying infrastructure. Wiz’s investigation describes the role activity, while AWS’s IAM documentation explains how third-party role access works.
How the access reached customer accounts
In a cross-account setup, a customer creates an IAM role and configures its trust policy to let an outside AWS account assume it. Wiz says the actor used credentials from account 805246085872, which it associates with Qubole’s platform, to make sts:AssumeRole requests against customer roles. A successful request provides temporary credentials with the permissions assigned to that role.
Every malicious request Wiz attributed to the actor included an accepted External ID. AWS describes an External ID as a way to address the “confused deputy” problem, in which a service with access to several customers could be induced to act for the wrong one. It is not a secret, and it does not replace limits on the trusted identity or the role’s permissions.
What investigators reported the actor accessed
Wiz reported queries to Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and Systems Manager Parameter Store, along with attempts to test discovered AWS, Microsoft Entra ID and Okta credentials using TruffleHog. It also described S3 downloads, including sessions in which some buckets were downloaded in full.
Sentra’s account adds observations from its own investigation: it reported activity across more than a dozen organizations, about 100 passwords and keys read in seven minutes, and no write actions in the activity it examined. Sentra also reported millions of downloaded files in one company’s accounts. Those figures describe Sentra’s investigation, not a campaign-wide total. Sentra’s account also explains how investigators tried to reconstruct S3 access.
When investigating suspected cloud access, treat a role-assumption event as a starting point: identifying the specific S3 objects read requires object-level records.
What CloudTrail can reveal about S3 access
CloudTrail management events can record role assumptions and bucket listings, but they do not identify each S3 object read. Wiz says S3 data events or server access logs are needed for that object-level detail.
Sentra described matching available file-access logs and encryption-related records to attacker sessions. It said objects using default encryption did not leave the same decryption trail, which could make its reconstructed file count incomplete. The difference matters during an investigation: a record that a role entered an account or listed a bucket does not, by itself, identify which files were accessed.
Indicators and review steps
Wiz recommended reviewing CloudTrail from October 1, 2026, in every account with a Qubole integration role, then examining activity associated with relevant role sessions. Its reported indicators include account 805246085872, session names beginning quiam-—including quiam-enum and quiam-scope-full—and two IAM principals:
AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFShad no activity other than activity associated with the actor in the environments Wiz observed.AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HWalso carried legitimate Qubole traffic from AWS infrastructure, so the source address matters when assessing its activity.
Wiz also listed IP addresses 45.83.220.211, 57.129.54.120 and 185.209.199.73. A match to a shared Mullvad VPN address alone is not conclusive. The company recommends examining GetCallerIdentity requests with a TruffleHog user agent when they coincide with an indicator IP, and checking identity-provider sign-in logs. Its further response guidance includes rotating secrets and parameters the role could read, revoking active sessions, removing unused vendor trust and narrowing permissions and trusted access.
Wiz separately identified suspicious activity from October 8 to 11 involving customer-owned AWS access keys believed to have been created for Qubole integrations. It has not linked that activity to the October 14–26 role-assumption campaign.