On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled 2–1 that the Pentagon could maintain one supply-chain-risk designation against Anthropic under 41 U.S.C. § 4713. The ruling leaves that designation in place; it addresses a separate legal track from a California decision against another designation in August.

The D.C. Circuit upheld one designation

The segment reports on the appellate court’s decision upholding the Pentagon’s designation against Anthropic.

Judges Gregory Katsas and Neomi Rao formed the majority, while Judge Karen Henderson dissented. The decision allows the Pentagon to continue excluding Anthropic technology from the Department of Defense’s supply chain under the § 4713 designation.

How both court rulings can stand

The two courts considered separate designations under different laws. On August 27, U.S. District Judge Rita Lin ruled against a parallel designation and broader government measures under 10 U.S.C. § 3252. The D.C. Circuit later considered the designation under 41 U.S.C. § 4713.

Legal trackStatuteRuling
California district court10 U.S.C. § 3252On August 27, Judge Rita Lin found the parallel designation and broader government measures unlawful.
D.C. Circuit41 U.S.C. § 4713On September 25, a 2–1 panel upheld the separate designation.

The dispute centered on Claude’s restrictions

Anthropic opposed use of its current Claude models for fully autonomous lethal weapons and mass surveillance of Americans. The Pentagon sought access for all lawful purposes. The appellate majority treated the possibility that Claude’s restrictions could prevent the Department from carrying out some requested lawful functions as a potential supply-chain risk under § 4713.

That was the majority’s legal rationale. It read the statute’s references to “any person” and “deny” broadly enough to cover the Department’s concern without requiring malicious conduct. The majority also recognized competing risks in military AI use: a model could be constrained in ways that affect operations, while an unconstrained model could produce inappropriate targets.

The majority and dissent read the law differently

Judge Henderson argued that § 4713, read in context, concerned deliberate interference or eavesdropping in the federal supply chain. In her view, it should not cover a contractor’s open enforcement of product-use restrictions. The disagreement was over how the statute applied to Anthropic’s safeguards, not a finding that the company had deliberately interfered with a military operation.

Anthropic said it disagreed with the appellate decision and was considering further review.